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ABSTRACT
Machine/Deep Learning (M/DL) as a Service stands as a promis-
ing solution for cloud-based inference applications. In this setting,
the cloud has a pre-learned model and large computing capacity
whereas the user has the samples on which she wants to run the
model. The main concern with these systems is related to the
privacy of the input data. Our work oers secure, ecient and
non-interactive privacy-preserving solution by employing high-
end technologies such as modern cryptographic primitives, ad-
vanced DL techniques and high-performance computing hardware.
Namely, we use Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), Convo-
lutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Graphics Processing Units
(GPUs).
FHE, with its widely-known feature of non-interactively computing
on encrypted data, empowers a wide range of privacy-concerned
cloud applications including M/DLaaS. This comes at a high cost
since FHE includes highly-intensive computation that requires enor-
mous computing power. Although the literature includes a number
of proposals to run CNNs on encrypted data, the performance is still
far from satisfactory. In this paper, we push the level up and show
how to accelerate the performance of running CNNs on encrypted
data using GPUs. We evaluated two CNNs to classify homomor-
phically the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets into 10 classes. We
used a number of techniques such as low-precision training, uni-
ed training and testing network, optimized FHE parameters and a
very ecient GPU implementation to achieve high performance.
Our solution achieved high security level (> 80 bit) and reasonable
classication accuracy (99%) and (77.55%) for MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively. In terms of performance, our best results show that
we could classify the entire testing datasets in 6.46 seconds (resp.
3044 seconds), with per-image amortized time (0.788 milliseconds)
(resp. 371 milliseconds) for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively.
KEYWORDS
Fully Homomorphic Encryption, Deep Learning, Encrypted Con-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine/Deep Learning (M/DL) has empowered a wide range of
applications from labelling systems, web searches, content ltering
to recommendation systems on entertainment and e-commerce
systems. The prominent feature of this technology is its ability to
perform tasks that we humans can do seamlessly such as labelling,
identication and recommendation. In order to do that, this tech-
nology relies on complex models that are able to capture specic
features from input data. Building these models is a complex task
that requires substantial domain expertise of several disciplines
starting from neurology to computer science. Therefore, there is
an evolving trend toward leasing instead of building these models,
which made Machine/Deep Learning as a Service (M/DLaaS) an
indispensable solution.
The cloud stands as a good platform to either create or host pre-
learned models as it oers cheap data storage, near-zero deployment
cost and high computational services [23]. However, it has some
drawbacks and raises important questions that need to be resolved.
One of the main questions is that cloud platforms do not guarantee
data privacy. In the DLaaS setting, the user uploads her data to
the cloud which in turn evaluates the model on the input data and
sends the results back to the user. At every step along this process,
there are numerous opportunities for attackers and other malicious
actors to compromise the data.
As a motivating example, suppose there is a nancial service
provider who claims to invalidate the ecient market hypothesis
and owns a model that can be used to predict the market value of a
designated class of companies with high accuracy rate. The service
provider would ideally want to monetize their service by hosting
it on the cloud and providing paid inferences according to certain
service agreements with the clients. Moreover, a potential client
may feel reluctant to use the service and share her condential
data with the cloud despite the potential return value. An ideal
solution to this problem shall protect both the model and private
data. Moreover, it has to reveal nothing about the prediction result.
Besides, the solution is preferred to be non-interactive, i.e., does
not require the client to be involved in the computation except for
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providing input and receiving output. Finally, the solution has to
be ecient with reasonable response time.
The main objective of our work is to provide secure, ecient
and non-interactive solution to the aforementioned scenario. Our
solution reveals nothing about the input, say x , to the cloud nor
it does about the model, say f , to the client except what can be
learned from input x and f (x). The system is also secure against
passive adversaries sning the communication between the cloud
and the client. However, we assume that the cloud is semi-honest,
i.e., it follows the protocol with the exception that it tries to learn
the private inputs from clients. Our solution is also ecient and
reasonably practical especially if multiple predictions are to be
made simultaneously. Lastly, it is non-interactive since the client
needs only to interact with the cloud to provide the input data and
receive the output.
There are at least three possible methods to tackle the aforemen-
tioned problem: 1) Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [36], such as
INTEL Software Guard Extensions (SGX) or AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV), which provides hardware-based primitives
that can be used to execute private data and/or code in shielded
environments, called enclaves, 2) Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
protocols which are algorithmic solutions that employ cryptogra-
phy to jointly evaluate a certain function between multiple parties
without revealing any party’s private input and 3) Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption (FHE) that allows anyone to evaluate a certain
function on encrypted data without decryption. TCB-based solu-
tions are very ecient and suitable for the cloud computing para-
digm. However, several attacks have been recently found to aect
TCB by allowing unprivileged programs to extract memory content
that is only accessible to privileged programs [13, 27, 32] which
raises more concerns about this technology. MPC solutions are
interactive solutions that require a fair amount of communication
between the participating parties, i.e., they are communication-
bound. On the other hand, FHE-based solutions are similar to MPC
solutions except that they are non-interactive. However, they are
considered compute-bound as they require an enormous amount
of computation. As computation is typically simpler to tackle than
communication, this work employs a combination of technologies
to design a FHE-based solution that is secure, ecient and non-
interactive.
FHE-based Privacy-preserving machine learning was considered
previously by Graepel et al. [19] and Aslett et al. [6]. Following
them, Dowlin et al. [16] proposed CryptoNets, the rst neural
network over encrypted data, providing a method to do the in-
ference phase of privacy-preserving deep learning. Since then,
others [10, 22, 24, 25, 33] have applied a variety of cryptographic
techniques, such as secure MPC and oblivious transfers, to achieve
similar goals. The main drawback of these FHE-based solutions is
the computational overhead. For instance, CryptoNets required 570
seconds to evaluate a FHE-friendly model on encrypted samples
from the MNIST dataset [30] at security level (80-bit). In addi-
tion, their network required a high plaintext modulus (t ≈ 280)
which had to be decomposed via the Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) into two smaller (240) moduli. Therefore, they had to run
the network twice to evaluate the model. Moreover, the scheme
they used (YASHE′) is not recommended to use due to recent lattice
subeld attacks [4]. To this end, we design a solution that over-
comes the aforementioned problems. For instance, our solution is
more ecient and requires only 6.46 seconds to evaluate the MNIST
model with security level > 91 bits. Also, it requires a much smaller
plaintext modulus (t ≈ 243) that can be used directly without CRT
decomposition.
Just as AlexNet by Krizhevsky et al. [29] showed how image clas-
sication is viable by running Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
on GPUs, our main contribution in this work is to show that privacy-
preserving deep learning is not only possible on GPUs but can
also be dramatically accelerated and oers a way towards ecient
DLaaS. We follow the framework put forward in CryptoNets [16]
and apply our GPU-accelerated FHE techniques to realize ecient
Homomorphic Convolutional Neural Networks (HCNNs).
Although the framework is available, there are still a number
of challenges to be addressed to realize practical HCNNs. FHE,
rst realized by Gentry [18] almost 10 years ago, allows arbitrary
computation on encrypted data. Informally, it works as follows.
Encryption masks the input data, called a plaintext, by a random
error sampled from some distribution, resulting in a ciphertext that
reveals nothing about what it encrypts. Decryption uses the secret
key to lter out the noise and retrieve the plaintext as long as the
noise is within a certain bound. Note that during computation, the
noise in ciphertexts grows but in a controlled manner. At some
point, it grows to a point where no further computation can be done
without resulting in a decryption failure. Bootstrapping can be used
to refresh a ciphertext with large noise into one with less noise
that can be used for further computation. By doing this indenitely,
theoretically, any function can be computed on encrypted data.
As bootstrapping is extremely expensive, this approach is still
impractical and bootstrapping is usually avoided in most practical
settings. Instead, the class of functions that can be evaluated is
restricted to depth L arithmetic circuits, yielding a levelled FHE
scheme that can be parameterized to support circuits of depth leqL.
For performance, L should be minimized which means that we
have to carefully design HCNNs with this in mind. Furthermore,
the model of computation in FHE, arithmetic circuits with homo-
morphic addition (HAdd) and multiplication (HMult) gates, is not
compatible with non-polynomial functions such as sigmoid, ReLU
and max. This means that we should use polynomial approxima-
tions to the activation functions where possible.
Besides that, we have to encode decimals in a form that is com-
patible with FHE plaintext data, which are usually integers. These
can have high precision which means that they will require integers
of large bit-size to represent them in the commonly used scalar
encoding. In this encoding, decimals are transformed into integers
by multiplying them with a scaling factor ∆ and then operated
on with HAdd and HMult normally. The main drawback of this
encoding is that we cannot re-scale encoded data mid-computation;
therefore, successive homomorphic operations will cause data size
to increase rapidly. Managing this scaling expansion is a necessary
step towards scaling HCNNs to larger datasets and deeper neural
networks.
Our Contributions.
(1) We present the rst GPU-accelerated Homomorphic Con-
volutional Neural Networks (HCNN) that runs a pre-learned
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model on encrypted data from the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets.
(2) We provide a rich set of optimization techniques to en-
able easy designs of HCNN and reduce the overall compu-
tational overhead. These include low-precision training,
optimized choice of FHE scheme and parameters, and a
GPU-accelerated implementation.
(3) We reduced the HCNN for the MNIST dataset to only 5
layers deep for both training and inference, smaller than
CryptoNets [16] which used 9 layers during training. For
CIFAR-10, we provide an 11-layer FHE-friendly network
which can be used for both training and inference as well.
(4) Our implementations shows high performance in terms of
runtime and accuracy. On the MNIST dataset, our HCNN
can evaluate the entire dataset in 8.10 seconds, 3.53× faster
than E2DM [24]. On CIFAR-10 dataset, our HCNN requires
3044 seconds, 3.83× faster than CryptoDL [21].
Related Work. The research in the area of privacy-preserving
deep learning can be roughly divided into two camps: those using
homomorphic encryption or combining it with secure multi-party
computation (MPC) techniques. Most closely related to our work
are CryptoNets by Dowlin et al. [16], FHE-DiNN by Bourse et
al. [10] and E2DM by Jiang et al. [24], who focus on using only fully
homomorphic encryption to address this problem. Dowlin et al. [16]
were the rst to propose using FHE to achieve privacy-preserving
deep learning, oering a framework to design neural networks that
can be run on encrypted data. They proposed using polynomial
approximations of the most widespread ReLU activation function
and using pooling layers only during the training phase to reduce
the circuit depth of their neural network. However, they used the
YASHE′ scheme by Bos et al. [9] which is no longer secure due to
attacks proposed by Albrecht et al. [4]. Also, they require a large
plaintext modulus of over 80 bits to accommodate the output result
of their neural network’s. This makes it very dicult to scale to
deeper networks since intermediate layers in those networks will
quickly reach several hundred bits with such settings.
Following them, Bourse et al. [10] proposed a new type of neural
network called discretized neural networks (DiNN) for inference
over encrypted data. Weights and inputs of traditional CNNs are
discretized into elements in {−1, 1} and the fast bootstrapping of
the TFHE scheme proposed by Chilotti et al. [14] was exploited to
double as an activation function for neurons. Each neuron computes
a weighted sum of its inputs and the activation function is the sign
function, sign(z) which outputs the sign of the input z. Although
this method can be applied to arbitrarily deep networks, it suers
from lower accuracy, achieving only 96.35% accuracy on the MNIST
dataset with lower amortized performance. Very recently, Jiang
et al. [24] proposed a new method for matrix multiplication with
FHE and evaluated a neural network on the MNIST data set using
this technique. They also considered packing an entire image into
a single ciphertext compared to the approach of Dowlin et al. [16]
who put only one pixel per ciphertext but evaluated large batches
of images at a time. They achieved good performance, evaluating
64 images in slightly under 29 seconds but with worse amortized
performance.
Some of the main limitations of pure FHE-based solutions is
the need to approximate non-polynomial activation functions and
high computation time. Addressing these problems, Liu et al. [33]
proposed MiniONN, a paradigm shift in securely evaluating neural
networks. They take commonly used protocols in deep learning and
transform them into oblivious protocols. With MPC, they could
evaluate neural networks without changing the training phase,
preserving accuracy since there is no approximation needed for
activation functions. However, MPC comes with its own set of
drawbacks. In this setting, each computation requires communica-
tion between the data owner and model owner, thus resulting in
high bandwidth usage. In a similar vein, Juvekar et al. [25] designed
GAZELLE. Instead of applying levelled FHE, they alternate between
an additive homomorphic encryption scheme for convolution-type
layers and garbled circuits for activation and pooling layers. This
way, communication complexity is reduced compared to MiniONN
but unfortunately is still signicant.
Organization of the Paper. Section 2 introduces fully homo-
morphic encryption and neural networks, the main components of
HCNNs. Following that, Section 3 discusses the challenges of adapt-
ing convolutional neural networks to the homomorphic domain.
Next, we describe the components that were used in implementing
HCNNs in Section 4. In Section 5, we report the results of experi-
ments done using our implementation of HCNNs on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Lastly, we conclude with Section 6 and discuss
some of the obstacles that will be faced when scaling HCNNs to
larger datasets and deeper networks.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review a set of notions that are required to
understand the paper. We start by introducing FHE, thereby de-
scribing the BFV scheme, an instance of levelled FHE schemes.
Next, we introduce neural networks and how to tweak them to
become compatible with FHE computation model.
2.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
First proposed by Rivest et al. [35], (FHE) was envisioned to enable
arbitrary computation on encrypted data. FHE would support op-
erations on ciphertexts that translate to functions on the encrypted
messages within. It remained unrealized for more than 30 years
until Gentry [18] proposed the rst construction. The blueprint of
this construction remains the only method to design FHE schemes.
The (modernized) blueprint is a simple two-step process. First, a
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that can evaluate its
decryption function is designed. Then, we perform bootstrapping,
which decrypts a ciphertext using an encrypted copy of the secret
key. Note that the decryption function here is evaluated homomor-
phically, i.e., on encrypted data and the result of decryption is also
encrypted.
As bootstrapping imposes high computation costs, we adopt a
levelled FHE scheme instead, which can evaluate functions up to
a pre-determined multiplicative depth without bootstrapping. We
chose the Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme [11, 17], whose
security is based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem
proposed by Lyubashevsky et al. [34]. This problem is conjectured
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to be hard even with quantum computers, backed by reductions
(in [34] among others) to worst-case problems in ideal lattices.
The BFV scheme has ve algorithms (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt,
HAdd, HMult). KeyGen generates the keys used in a FHE scheme
given the parameters chosen. Encrypt and Decrypt are the encyp-
tion and decryption algorithms respectively. The dierentiation
between FHE and standard public-key encryption schemes is the
operations on ciphertexts; which we call HAdd and HMult. HAdd
outputs a ciphertext that decrypts to the sum of the two input en-
crypted messages while HMult outputs one that decrypts to the
product of the two encrypted inputs.
We informally describe the basic scheme below and refer to [17]
for the complete details. Let k,q, t > 1 with N = 2k , t prime and
R = Z[X ]/〈XN +1〉, we denote the ciphertext space as Rq = R/qR
and message space as Rt = R/tR. We call ring elements “small”
when their coecients have small absolute value.
• KeyGen(λ,L): Given security parameter λ and level L as
inputs, choose k,q so that security level λ is achieved.
Choose a random element a ∈ Rq , “small” noise e ∈ Rq
and secret key s ∈ R2, the public key is dened to be
pk = (b = e − as,a).
• Encrypt(pk,m): Given public key pk and messagem ∈ Rt
as input, the encryption ofm is dened as c = (br ′ + e ′ +
bq/tcm,ar ′), for some random noise e ′, r ′ ∈ Rq .
• Decrypt(sk, c): Given secret key sk and ciphertext c =
(c0, c1) ∈ R2q as inputs, the decryption of c is
m = d(t/q)(c0 + c1s mod q)c mod t .
• HAdd(c1, c2): Given two ciphertexts c1 = (c0,1, c1,1), c2 =
(c0,2, c1,2) as inputs, the operation is simply component-
wise addition, i.e. the output ciphertext is c′ = (c0,1 +
c0,2, c1,1 + c1,2).
• HMult(c1, c2): Given two ciphertexts c1 = (c0,1, c1,1), c2 =
(c0,2, c1,2) as inputs, proceed as follows:
(1) (Tensor) compute
c∗ = (c0,1c0,2, c0,1c1,2 + c1,1c0,2, c1,1c1,2); (1)
(2) (Scale and Relinearize) output
c′ =
⌈
Relinearize(d(t/q)c∗c)⌋ mod q. (2)
Where Relinearize(c∗) is used to shrink the size of c∗ from three
back to two terms.
2.1.1 Correctness of the Scheme. For the scheme to be correct,
we require that Decrypt(sk, c) for c output from Encrypt(pk,m),
where (pk, sk = s) is a correctly generated key-pair from KeyGen.
We characterize when decryption will succeed in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Let c = (c0 = bq/tcm′ + e −c1s, c1) be a ciphertext.
Then, Decrypt outputs the correct messagem =m′ if ‖e ‖∞ < q/2t ,
where ‖e‖∞ is the largest coecient of the polynomial e ∈ Rq .
Proof. Recall that the decryption procedure computes m =
d(t/q)(c0 + c1s) mod qc mod t . Therefore, to have m =m′, we rst
require c0 + c1s < q which means that bq/tcm′ + e < q. Finally,
we need the rounding operation to outputm′ after scaling by t/q
which requires that ‖e ‖∞ < q/2t since (t/q) · e must be less than
1/2. 
To see why HAdd works, part of the decryption requires com-
puting
c0,1 + c0,2 + (c1,1 + c1,2)s = (c0,1 + c1,1s) + (c0,2 + c1,2s)
= dq/tcm1 + e1 + dq/tcm2 + e2
= dq/tc (m1 +m2) + e1 + e2.
This equation remains correct modulo q as long as the errors are
small, i.e. ‖e1 + e2‖∞ < q/2t . Therefore, scaling by (t/q) and
rounding will be correct which means that we obtain the desired
message.
For HMult, the procedure is more complicated but observe that
(c0,1 + c1,1s)(c0,2 + c1,2s) =
c0,1c0,2 + (c0,1c1,2 + c1,1c0,2)s + c1,1c1,2s2
(3)
This means that we need s as well as s2 to recover the de-
sired message from c∗. However, with a process called relineariza-
tion (Relinearize), proposed by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [12]
and applicable to the BFV scheme, c∗ can be transformed to be
decryptable under the original secret key s .
2.1.2 Computation Model with Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
The set of functions that can be evaluated with FHE are arithmetic
circuits over the plaintext ring Rt . However, this is not an easy
plaintext space to work with; elements in Rt are polynomials of
degree up to several thousand. Addressing this issue, Smart and
Vercauteren [39] proposed a technique to support single instruction
multiple data (SIMD) by decomposing Rt into a product of smaller
spaces with the Chinese Remainder Theorem over polynomial rings.
For prime t ≡ 1 mod 2N , XN + 1 ≡∏Ni=1(X − αi ) mod t for some
αi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t−1}. This means thatRt = ∏Ni=1 Zt [X ]/〈X−αi 〉 ∏N
i=1 Zt . Therefore, the computation model generally used with
homomorphic encryption is arithmetic circuits with modulo t gates.
For eciency, the circuits evaluated using the HAdd and HMult
algorithms should be levelled. This means that the gates of the
circuits can be organized into layers, with inputs in the rst layer
and output at the last, and the outputs of one layer are inputs to
gates in the next layer. In particular, the most important property
of arithmetic circuits for FHE is its depth. The depth of a circuit is
the maximum number of multiplication gates along any path of the
circuit from the input to output layers.
A levelled FHE scheme with input level L can evaluate circuits
of at most depth L which aects the choice of parameter q due to
noise in ciphertexts. In particular, the HMult operation on cipher-
text is the main limiting factor to homomorphic evaluations. By
multiplying two ciphertexts results, we have:
c0,1c0,2 = (dq/tcm1 + e1)(dq/tcm2 + e2)
= (dq/tcm1)(dq/tcm2)+
dq/tcm1e2 + dq/tcm2e1 + e1e2︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
e ′
.
Even after scaling by t/q, the overall noise (≈ t/q·e ′) in the output c′
is larger than that of the inputs, c1 and c2. Successive calls to HMult
have outputs that steadily grow. Since decryption only succeeds
if the error in the ciphertext is less than q/2t , the maximum depth
of a circuit supported is determined by the ciphertext modulus
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q. To date, the only known method to sidestep this is with the
bootstrapping technique proposed by Gentry [18].
2.2 Neural Networks
A neural network can be seen as an arithmetic circuit comprising
a certain number of layers. Each layer consists of a set of nodes,
with the rst being the input of the network. Nodes in the layers
beyond the rst take the outputs from a subset of nodes in the
previous layer and output the evaluation of an activation function
over them. The values of the nodes in the last layer are the outputs
of the neural network.
The most widely-used layers can be grouped into three cate-
gories:
(1) Activation layers: Each node in this layer takes the output,
z, of a single node of the previous layer and outputs f (z)
for some function z.
(2) Convolution-Type layers: Each node in this layer takes the
outputs, z, of some subset of nodes from the previous layer
and outputs a weighted-sum 〈w, z〉 + b for some weight
vector w and bias b.
(3) Pooling layers: Each node in this layer takes the outputs,
z, of some subset of nodes from the previous layer and
outputs f (z) for some function f .
The functions used in the activation layers are quite varied,
including sigmoid (f (z) = 11+e−z ), softplus (f (z) = log(1 + ez )) and
ReLU, where
ReLU(z) =
{
z, if z ≥ 0;
0, otherwise.
To adapt neural networks operations over encrypted data, we use
the following layers:
• Convolution (weighted-sum) layer: at each node, we take
a subset of the outputs of the previous layer, also called
a lter, and perform a weighted-sum on them to get its
output.
• Average-Pooling layer: at each node, we take a subset of
the outputs of the previous layer and compute the average
on them to get its output.
• Square layer: each node linked to a single node z of the
previous layer; its output is the square of z’s output.
• Fully Connected layer: similar to the convolution layer,
each node outputs a weighted-sum, but over the entire
previous layer rather than a subset of it.
3 HOMOMORPHIC CONVOLUTIONAL
NEURAL NETWORKS
Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables computation directly on
encrypted data. This is ideal to handle the challenges that M/DL
face when it comes to questions of data privacy. We call CNNs
that operate over encrypted data as Homomorphic CNNs (HCNNs).
Although FHE promises a lot, there are several challenges, ranging
from the choice of plaintext space to translating neural network
operations, that prevent straightforward translation of standard
techniques for traditional CNNs to HCNNs. These challenges are
described below.
3.1 Plaintext Space
The rst problem is the choice of plaintext space for HCNN compu-
tation. Weights and inputs of a neural network are usually decimals,
which are represented in oating-point. Unfortunately, these can-
not be directly encoded and processed in most FHE libraries and
thus require special treatment. For simplicity and to allow inference
on large datasets, we pack the same pixel of multiple images in a
single ciphertext as shown in Figure 1. Note that the BFV scheme
can be instantiated such that ciphertexts may contain a number of
slots to store multiple plaintext messages. It should be remarked
that this packing scheme was rst proposed by CryptoNets [16].
0 0 0
1 1 1
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
image 0 image 1 image 9999 
. . .
. 
. 
. 
783 783 783
ciphertext 0
ciphertext 1
ciphertext 783 
Figure 1: Packing MNIST testing dataset. Ciphertext i con-
tains pixel i from all images.
Encoding into the Plaintext Space. We adopt the scalar en-
coding, which approximates these decimals with integers. It is done
by multiplying them with a scaling factor ∆ and rounding the re-
sult to the nearest integer. Then, numbers encoded with the same
scaling factor can be combined with one another using integer addi-
tion or multiplication. For simplicity, we normalize the inputs and
weights of HCNNs in between [0, 1] and ∆ (initially) corresponds
to the number of bits of precision of the approximation, as well as
the upper bound on the approximation.
Although straightforward to use, there are some downsides to
this encoding. The scale factor cannot be adjusted mid-computation
and mixing numbers with dierent scaling factors is not straight-
forward. For example, suppose we have two messages ∆1m1,∆2m2
with two dierent scaling factors, where ∆1 < ∆2:
∆1m1 + ∆2m2 = ∆2(m2 + ∆2/∆1m1)
∆1m1 × ∆2m2 = ∆1∆2(m1m1).
Multiplication will just change the scaling factor of the result to
∆1∆2 but the result of adding two encoded numbers is not their
standard sum. This means that as homomorphic operations are
done on encoded data, the scaling factor in the outputs increases
without a means to control it. Therefore, the plaintext modulus t
has to be large enough to accommodate the maximum number that
is expected to result from homomorphic computations.
With the smallest scaling factor, ∆ = 2, 64 multiplications will
suce to cause the result to potentially overow the space of 64-bit
integers. Unfortunately, we use larger ∆ in most cases which means
that the expected maximum will be much larger. Thus, we require
a way to handle large plaintext moduli of possibly several hundred
bits, which is described next.
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Figure 2: Plaintext CRT decomposition for a FHE arithmetic
circuit
Plaintext Space CRT Decomposition. One way to achieve
this is to use a composite plaintext modulus, t =
∏r−1
i=0 ti for some
primes t0, . . . , tr−1 such that t is large enough to accommodate the
maximum intermediate result the network may generate. Recall
that the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) gives us an isomor-
phism between Zt and
∏r−1
i=0 Zti :
CRT : Zt0 × · · · × Ztr−1 −→ Zt
m = (m0, . . . , mr−1) 7−→m,
where mi ∈ Zti and m ∈ Zt . The inverse map is:
ICRT : Zt −→ Zt0 × · · · × Ztr−1
m 7−→ m = (m0, . . . , mr−1);
where for any m ∈ Zt , we have CRT(ICRT(m)) =m.
For such moduli, we can decompose any integer m < t into
a length-r vector with ICRT. Arithmetic modulo t is replaced by
component-wise addition and multiplication modulo the prime ti
for the i-th entry of m. We can recover the output of any computa-
tion with CRT.
As illustrated in Figure 2, for homomorphic operations modulo
t , we separately encrypt each entry of m in r FHE instances with
the appropriate ti and perform modulo ti operations. At the end
of the homomorphic computation of function f , we decrypt the
r ciphertexts, which gives us f (m). The actual output f (m) is
obtained by applying the CRT map to f (m).
3.2 Neural Network Layers
Computation in FHE schemes are generally limited to addition and
multiplication operations over ciphertexts. As a result, it is easy to
compute polynomial functions with FHE schemes. As with all FHE
schemes, encryption injects a bit of noise into the data and each
operation on ciphertexts increases the noise within it. As long as
the noise does not exceed some threshold, decryption is possible.
Otherwise, the decrypted results are essentially meaningless.
Approximating Non-Polynomial Activations. For CNNs, a
major stumbling block for translation to the homomorphic domain
is the activation functions. These are usually not polynomials, and
therefore unsuitable for evaluation with FHE schemes. The eec-
tiveness of the ReLU function in convolutional neural networks
means that it is almost indispensable. Therefore, it should be ap-
proximated by some polynomial function to try to retain as much
accuracy as possible. The choice of approximating polynomial de-
pends on the desired performance of the HCNN. For example, in
this work, we applied the square function, z 7→ z2, which Dowlin et
al. [16] found to be sucient for accurate results on the MNIST
dataset with a ve-layer network.
The choice of approximation polynomial determines the depth of
the activation layers as well as its complexity (number of HMults).
The depth and complexity of this layer will be dlogde and d − 1
respectively, where d is the degree of the polynomial. However,
with the use of scalar encoding, there is another eect to consider.
Namely, the scaling factor on the output will be dependent on the
depth of the approximation, i.e. if the scaling factor of the inputs to
the activation layer is ∆, then the scaling factor of the outputs will
be roughly ∆1+ dlogd e , assuming that the approximation is a monic
polynomial.
Handling Pooling Layers. Similar to activations, the usual
functions used in pooling layers, maximum (max(z) = max1≤i≤n zi ),
`2-norm and mean (avg(z) = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi ) for inputs z = (z1, . . . , zn ),
are generally non-polynomial. Among these, avg is the most FHE-
friendly as it requires a number of additions and scaling by a known
constant. We note that several works [26, 40] have shown that
pooling is not strictly necessary and good results can be obtained
without it. We found that pooling layers are not necessary for our
MNIST network. On the other hand, pooling gave better accuracy
results with the CIFAR-10 network.
Convolution-Type Layers. Lastly, we have the convolutional-
type layers. Since these are weighted sums, they are straightforward
to compute over encrypted data; the weights can be multiplied to
encrypted inputs with HMultPlain and the results summed with
HAdd. Nevertheless, we still have to take care of the scaling factor
of outputs from this layer. At rst thought, we may take the output
scaling factor as ∆w∆i , multiply the scaling factor of the weights
and the inputs, denoted with ∆w and ∆i respectively. But, there
is actually the potential for numbers to increase in bit-size from
the additions done in weighted sums. Recall that when adding
two ∆-bit numbers, the upper bound on the sum is ∆ + 1 bits long.
Therefore, the maximum number that can appear in the worst-case
in the convolutions is about ∆w∆i × 2 dlogn e bits long, where n
is the number of terms in the summands. In practice, this bound
is usually not achieved since the summands are almost never all
positive. With negative numbers in the mix, the actual contribution
from the summation can be moderated by some constant 0 < c < 1.
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4 IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation is comprised of two parts: 1) training on unen-
crypted data and 2) classifying encrypted data. Training is per-
formed using the 5-layer (for MNIST) and 11-layer (for CIFAR-10)
networks whose details are shown in Table 1 and 2. We use the
Tensorpack framework [41] to train the network and compute the
model. This part is quite straightforward and can be simply veried
by classifying the unencrypted test dataset. For neural networks
design, one of the major constraints posed by homomorphic encryp-
tion is the limitation of numerical precision of layer-wise weight
variables. Training networks with lower precision weights would
signicantly prevent the precision explosion in ciphertext as net-
work depth increases and thus speed up inference rate in encrypted
domain. To this end, we propose to train low-precision networks
from scratch, without incurring much loss in accuracy compared
to networks trained in oating point precision. Following [42], for
each convolutional layer, we quantize oating point weight vari-
ablesw to k bits numberswq using simple uniform scalar quantizer
shown below:
wq =
1
2k − 1round(w ∗ (2
k − 1))
This equation is a non-dierentiable function, we use Straight
Through Estimator (STE) [8] to enable the back-propagation. We
trained the 5-layer network on MNIST training set with a precision
of weights at 2, 4, 8 and 32 bits, and evaluated on MNIST test set
with reported accuracy 96%, 99%, 99% and 99% respectively. In view
of this, we choose the 4-bit network for the following experiments.
It’s worth noting that CryptoNets [16] requires 5 to 10 bits of pre-
cision on weights to hit 99% accuracy on MNIST test set, while
our approach further reduces it to 4 bits and still maintains the
same accuracy with both oating-point and scalar encoding. For
CIFAR-10, as the problem is more challenging and the network
is deeper, our network shown in Table 2 uses 8 bits and achieves
77.80% and 77.55% classication accuracy with the oating-point
and scalar encoding, respectively.
The second part is more involved as it requires running the net-
work (with the pre-learned model) on encrypted data. First, we
need to x FHE parameters to accommodate for both the network
multiplicative depth and precision. We optimized the scaling fac-
tors in all aspects of the HCNN. For the MNIST network, inputs
were normalized to [0, 1], scaled by 4 and then rounded to nearest
integer. With the low-precision network trained from scratch, we
convert the weights of the convolution-type layers to short 4-bit
integers, using a small scaling factor of 15; no bias was used in
the convolutions. Similarly, inputs to the CIFAR-10 network were
normalized to [0, 1] but we used much larger scale factors for the
convolution layers. Moreover, padding has been used as it provided
better accuracy. The scaling factors for both networks are shown
in Tables 1 and 2.
Next, we implement the networks (with scalar encoding) using
NTL [37] (a multi-precision number theory C++ library). NTL is
used to facilitate the treatment of the scaled inputs and accommo-
date for precision expansion of the intermediate values during the
network evaluation. We found that the largest precision needed
is less than (243) for MNIST and (2204) for CIFAR-10. Note that for
MNIST, it is low enough to t in a single word on 64-bit platforms
Table 1: HCNN architecture for training and testing MNIST
dataset with the scale factor used in scalar encoding. Inputs
are scaled by 4.
Layer Type Description Layer Size Scale
Convolution 5 lters of size 5 × 5 and stride (2, 2) withoutpadding. 12 × 12 × 5 15
Square Outputs of the previous layer are squared. 12 × 12 × 5 1
Convolution 50 lters of size 5× 5 and stride (2, 2) withoutpadding. 4 × 4 × 50 15
Square Outputs of the previous layer are squared. 4 × 4 × 50 1
Fully Connected
Weighted sum of the entire previous layer
with 10 lters, each output corresponding to 1
of the possible 10 digits.
1 × 1 × 10 15
without overow. On the other hand, we use the plaintext CRT
decomposition to handle the large plaintext modulus required for
CIFAR-10. By estimating the maximum precision required by the
networks, we can estimate the FHE parameters required by HCNN.
Table 2: HCNN architecture for training and testing CIFAR-
10 dataset with the scale factor used in scalar encoding. In-
puts are scaled by 255.
Layer Type Description Layer Size Scale
Convolution 32 lters of size 3 ÃŮ 3 x 3 and stride (1, 1)
with padding.
32 x 32 x 32 10000
Square Outputs of the previous layer are squared. 32 x 32 x 32 1
Pooling Average pooling with extent 2 and stride 2. 16 x 16 x 32 1
Convolution 64 lters of size 3 ÃŮ 3 x 32 and stride (1, 1)
with padding.
16 x 16 x 64 4095
Square Outputs of the previous layer are squared. 16 x 16 x 64 1
Pooling Average pooling with extent 2 and stride 2. 8 x 8 x 64 1
Convolution 128 lters of size 3 ÃŮ 3 x 64 and stride (1, 1)
with padding.
8 x 8 x 128 10000
Square Outputs of the previous layer are squared. 8 x 8 x 128 1
Pooling Average pooling with extent 2 and stride 2. 4 x 4 x 128 1
Fully Connected Weighted sum of the entire previous layer
with 256 lters
1 x 1 x 256 1023
Fully Connected Weighted sum of the entire previous layer
with 10 lters.
1 x 1 x 10 63
The next step is to implement the network using a FHE library.
We implement MNIST HCNN using two FHE libraries: SEAL [1]
and GPU-accelerated BFV (A∗FV) that is described in [3]. On the
other hand, we implement CIFAR-10 HCNN only using A∗FV as it
is more computationally intensive and would take a very long time.
The purpose of implementing MNIST HCNN in SEAL is to facilitate
a more unied comparison under the same system parameters and
show the superiority of the GPU implementation. In addition, we
would like to highlight a limitation in the Residue Number Systems
(RNS) variant that is currently implemented in SEAL.
4.1 HCNN Complexity
In this section, we break down the complexity of both HCNNs
layers and calculate the total number of operations required for
homomorphic evaluation. We also compare our MNIST HCNN
with CryptoNets’s network [16].
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Table 3 shows the computational complexity of each layer in
MNIST HCNN and CryptoNets. The convolution and fully con-
nected layers require homomorphic multiplication of ciphertext by
plaintext (HMultPlain). Suppose the input to the convolution or
fully connected layers is vector i of length l and the output is vector
o of length m. Let fw and fh denote the lter width and height,
respectively. The total number of HMultPlain in the convolution
layer can be found bym · fw · fh . The fully connected layer requires
l ·m HMultPlain operations. On the other hand, the square layer
requires l =m ciphertext by ciphertext multiplications (HMult). It
should be noted that most of FHE libraries provide an additional
procedure for homomorphic squaring (HSquare) which has slightly
lower computational complexity compared to HMult, (see Table 8).
It can be clearly noticed that HCNN requires much lower number
of HMultPlain compared to CryptoNets (46,000 vs 106,625). In
CryptoNets, the third layer combines 4 linear layers (2 scaled mean
pool, convolution and fully connected layers) for eciency reasons,
whereas it is simply a convolution layer in HCNN. On the other
hand, CryptoNets requires less HSquare (945 vs 1,520).
Table 4 shows the computational complexity for CIFAR-10 HCNN.
It can be clearly seen that CIFAR-10 HCNN is more computationally
intensive compared to MNIST. For instance, 6,952,332 HMultPlain
and 57,344 HMult operations are required compared to 46,000 and
1,520, respectively for MNIST HCNN.
4.2 Choice of Parameters
Similar to other cryptographic schemes, one needs to select FHE
parameters to ensure that known attacks are computationally infea-
sible. We denote to the desired security parameter by λ measured in
bits. This means that an adversary needs to perform 2λ elementary
(or bit) operations to break the scheme with probability one. A
widely accepted estimate for λ in the literature is ≥ 80 bits [38],
which is used here to generate the BFV parameters.
In this work, we used a levelled BFV scheme that can be con-
gured to support a known multiplicative depth L, which can be
controlled by three parameters: q, t and noise growth. The rst
two are problem dependent whereas noise growth depends on the
scheme. As mentioned in the previous section, we found that t
should be at least 43 (resp. 204) bit integer for MNIST (resp. CIFAR-
10) to accommodate the precision expansion in HCNN evaluation.
For our HCNNs, 5 (resp. 11) multiplicative depth is required:
2 (resp. 3) ciphertext by ciphertext (in the square layers) and 3
(resp. 8) ciphertext by plaintext (in convolution, pooling and fully
connected layers) operations for MNIST and CIFAR-10 HCNNs,
respectively. It is known that the latter has a lower eect on noise
growth. This means that L needs not to be set to 5 for MNIST
and 11 for CIFAR-10. We found that L = 4 and 7 are sucient to
run MNIST and CIFAR-10 HCNNs, respectively in A∗FV. However,
SEAL required higher depth (L = 5) to run our MNIST HCNN. The
reason is that SEAL implements the Bajard-Enyard-Hasan-Zucca
(BEHZ) [7] RNS variant of the BFV scheme that slightly increases
the noise growth due to approximated RNS operations. Whereas
in A∗FV, the Halevi-Polyakov-Shoup (HPS) [20] RNS variant is
implemented which has a lower eect on the noise growth. For a
detailed comparison of these two RNS variants, we refer the reader
to [2].
Having L and t xed, we can estimate q using the noise growth
bounds enclosed with the BFV scheme. Next, we try to estimate N
to ensure a certain security level. To calculate the security level,
we used the LWE hardness estimator in [5] (commit 76d05ee).
The above discussion suggests that the design space of HCNN is
not limited depending on the choice of the plaintext coecient
modulus t . We identify a set of possible designs that t dierent
requirements. The designs vary in the number of factors in t (i.e.,
number of CRT channels) and the provided security level. We
provide four sets of parameters for MNIST and one for CIFAR-10.
Parameter sets 2 and 4 are shown here to enable running our MNIST
HCNN with SEAL. As will be shown later in the subsequent section,
SEAL requires a higher q due to the higher noise growth in its
underlying FHE scheme. Table 5 shows the system parameters used
for each HCNN with the associated security level. Note that we
use 10 primes for the plaintext moduli, each of size 22/23 bits, to
run the CIFAR-10 HCNN. The product of these small primes gives
us a 219-bit plaintext modulus which is sucient to accommodate
any intermediate result in CIFAR-10 HCNN. Note that we have to
run 10 instances of CIFAR-10 HCNN to obtain the desired result.
However, these instances are embarrassingly parallel and can be
run simultaneously.
It is worth noting also that the choice of the primes in the plain-
text modulus is not arbitrary especially if one wants to do the infer-
ence for multiple images at once. To enable the packed encoding
described in Section 3.1, one has to ensure that 2N |(t − 1).
4.3 HCNN Inference Library
As most deep learning frameworks do not use functions that t the
restrictions of FHE schemes, we designed an inference library using
standard C++ libraries that implement some of the CNN layers using
only additions and multiplications. Support for arbitrary scaling
factors per layer is included for exibility and allows us to easily
dene neural network layers for HCNN inference. We give a brief
summary of the scaling factor growth of the layers we used in
Table 6.
In Section 2.2, we introduced several types of layers that are
commonly used in designing neural networks, namely activation,
convolution-type and pooling. Now, we briey describe how our
library realizes these layers. For convolution-type layers, they are
typically expressed with matrix operations but only require scalar
additions and multiplications. Our inference library implements
them using the basic form, b+
∑n
i=1wi ·zi , for input z = (z1, . . . , zn )
and weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn ).
For the activation, some modications had to be done for com-
patibility with FHE schemes. In activation layers, the most com-
monly used functions are ReLU, sigmoid (f (z) = 11+e−z ) and soft-
plus (f (z) = log(1 + ez )). These are non-polynomial functions and
thus cannot be directly evaluated over FHE encrypted data. Our
library uses integral polynomials to approximate these functions;
particularly for our HCNN, we used the square function, f (z) = z2,
as a low-complexity approximation of ReLU.
The pooling layers used are average-pooling and they are quite
similar to the convolution layers except that the weights are all
ones and a scale factor that is equal to the reciprocal of the number
of averaged values.
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Table 3: MNIST HCNN vs CryptoNets [16] complexity for homomorphic inference
MNIST HCNN CryptoNets
Layer #
Input Neurons Output Neurons # of Multiplications Input Neurons Output Neurons # of Multiplications
HMultPlain HMult HMultPlain HMult
1 28×28 = 784 5×12×12 = 720 25×720 = 18,000 - 29×29 = 841 5×13×13 = 845 25×845 = 21,125 -
2 5×12×12 = 720 5×12×12 = 720 - 720 5×13×13 = 845 5×13×13 = 845 - 845
3 5×12×12 = 720 4×4×50 = 800 25×800 = 20,000 - 5×13×13 = 845 1×1×100 = 100 100×845 = 84,500 -
4 4×4×50 = 800 4×4×50 = 800 - 800 1×1×100 = 100 1×1×100 = 100 - 100
5 4×4×50 = 800 1×1×10 = 10 10×800 = 8,000 - 1×1×100 = 100 1×1×10 = 10 10×100 = 1,000 -
Total 46,000 1,520 Total 106,625 945
Table 4: CIFAR-10 HCNN complexity for homomorphic in-
ference
CIFAR-10 HCNN
Layer #
Input Neurons Output Neurons No. of Multiplications
HMultPlain HMult
1 32 x 32 x 3 = 3072 32 x 32 x 32 = 32768 589,824 -
2 32 x 32 x 32 = 32768 32 x 32 x 32 = 32768 - 32,768
3 32 x 32 x 32 = 32768 16 x 16 x 32 = 8192 0 -
4 16 x 16 x 32 = 8192 16 x 16 x 64 = 16384 2,594,048 -
5 16 x 16 x 64 = 16384 16 x 16 x 64 = 16384 - 16,384
6 16 x 16 x 64 = 16384 8 x 8 x 64 = 4096 0 -
7 8 x 8 x 64 = 4096 8 x 8 x 128 = 8192 3,308,544 -
8 8 x 8 x 128 = 8192 8 x 8 x 128 = 8192 - 8,192
9 8 x 8 x 128 = 8192 4 x 4 x 128 = 2048 0 -
10 4 x 4 x 128 = 2048 1 x 1 x 256 = 256 457,398 -
11 1 x 1 x 256 = 256 1 x 1 x 10 = 10 2518 -
Total 6,952,332 57,344
Table 5: HE parameters for MNIST and CIFAR-10 HCNNs
with dierent parameter sets. Depth refers to the supported
multiplicative depth and λ denotes the security level in bits.
HCNN Param ID N logq Plaintext moduli Depth λ
MNIST
1 213 330 5522259017729 4 82
2 213 360 5522259017729 5 76
3 214 330 5522259017729 4 175
4 214 360 5522259017729 5 159
CIFAR-10 5 213 300
2424833, 2654209, 2752513, 3604481,
3735553, 4423681, 4620289, 4816897,
4882433, 5308417
7 91
Table 6: Scaling Factor Growth by Layer
Layer Type Output Scaling Factor
Convolution-Type (
∑n
i=1wi zi ) ∆o = ∆w∆i · 2c dlogne , for some 0 < c < 1.
Square Activation (f (z) = z2) ∆o = ∆2i .
where ∆i and ∆w are the input and weight scaling factors respectively.
4.4 GPU-Accelerated Homomorphic
Encryption
The FHE engine includes an implementation of an RNS variant of
the BFV scheme [20] that is described in [2, 3]. The BFV scheme
is considered among the most promising FHE schemes due to its
simple structure and low overhead primitives compared to other
schemes. Moreover, it is a scale-invariant scheme where the cipher-
text coecient modulus is xed throughout the entire computation.
This contrasts to other scale-variant schemes that keep a chain
of moduli and switch between them during computation. We use
a GPU-based BFV implementation as an underlying FHE engine
to perform the core FHE primitives: key generation, encryption,
decryption and homomorphic operations such as addition and mul-
tiplication.
Our FHE engine (shown in Figure 3) is comprised of three main
components:
(1) Polynomial Arithmetic Unit (PAU): performs basic polyno-
mial arithmetic such as addition and multiplication.
(2) Residue Number System Unit (RNSU): provides additional
RNS tools for ecient polynomial scaling required by BFV
homomorphic multiplication and decryption.
(3) Random Number Generator Unit (RNG): used to generate
random polynomials required by BFV key generation and
encryption.
In addition, the FHE engine includes a set of Look-Up Tables (LUTs)
that are used for fast modular arithmetic and number theoretic
transforms required by both PAU and RNSU. For further details
on the GPU implementation of BFV, we refer the reader to the
aforementioned works.
GPU
CPU
RNG
LUT
PAU
RNSU
Add
Mul
FBC
SaR
Figure 3: Top-Level Structure of the GPU-Accelerated
A∗FV Crypto-Processor.
4.4.1 Fiing HCNN in GPU Memory. Another major challenge
facing FHE applications is memory requirements due to data ex-
pansion after encryption. The ciphertext size can be estimated as
2 ∗ N ∗ log2 q bits, this is approximately 1.28 MB and 0.59 MB for
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MNIST and CIFAR-10 HCNNs parameters, respectively. Moreover,
due to homomorphic multiplication, ciphertext size may expand
3× its original size due to intermediate computation [2]. As we
basically encrypt one pixel - from multiple images - in one cipher-
text, this means that in our HCNNs the number of ciphertexts for
each layer is equal to the number of pixels in the feature map. For
MNIST HCNN, the GPU memory (16 GB) was sucient to store
or generate all the ciphertexts in each layer. On the other hand,
the memory was not enough to hold the rst convolution layer in
CIFAR-10 HCNN. Therefore, we had to process the feature map in
batches by uploading parts of the feature map to the GPU memory
when needed. An illustrative trajectory of how we span the feature
map is shown in Figure 4. Note that we try to minimize the amount
of CPU-GPU communication by caching the ciphertexts to be used
in subsequent batches.
Figure 4: A batched processing of convolution and pooling
layers for CIFAR-10 HCNN. Items in red are newly fetched
items.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND COMPARISONS
In this section, we describe our experiments to evaluate the per-
formance of our HCNNs using the aforementioned designs. We
start by describing the hardware conguration. Next, we list the
main FHE primitives used to run HCNN alongside benchmarks
to provide more insight into their computational complexity. We
also present the results of running MNIST HCNN in both SEAL
version 2.3.1 and A∗FV together with discussion and remarks on
performance and noise growth.
5.1 Hardware Conguration
The experiments were performed on a server with an Intel® Xeon®
Platinum 8170 CPU @ 2.10 GHz with 26 cores, 188 GB RAM and
an NVIDIA® GPU cluster that includes one V100 and three P100
Tesla cards with 4 × 16 GB on-board memory. Table 7 shows the
conguration of the testbed server used for all experiments.
5.2 Datasets
MNIST.The MNIST dataset [30] consists of 60,000 images (50,000 in
Table 7: Hardware conguration of the testbed servers
Feature CPU GPU Cluster
Model Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum V100 P100
Compute Capability − 7.0 6.0
# of processing units 2 1 3
# Cores (total) 26 5120 3584
Core Frequency 2.10 GHz 1.380 GHz 1.328 GHz
Memory Type 72-bit DDR4 4096-bit HBM2 4096-bit HBM2
Memory Bandwidth 30 GB/sec 732 GB/sec 900 GB/sec
Memory Capacity 187.5 GB 16 GB 3 × 16 GB
PCI-e Bandwidth 16 GB/sec
training dataset and 10,000 in testing dataset) of hand-written digits,
each is a 28 × 28 array of values between 0 and 255, corresponding
to the gray level of a pixel in the image.
CIFAR-10. The CIFAR-10 dataset [28] consists of 60,000 colour
images (50,000 in training dataset and 10,000 in testing dataset) of
10 dierent classes. Each images consists of 32 × 32 × 3 pixels of
values between 0 and 255.
5.3 Micro-Benchmarks
Our HCNNs use 6 FHE primitives: 1) Key generation (KeyGen), 2)
Encryption (Enc), 3) Decryption (Dec), 4) Homomorphic addition
(HAdd), 5) Homomorphic squaring (HSquare) and 6) Homomorphic
multiplication of ciphertext by plaintext (HMultPlain). Table 8
shows these primitives and their latency in milliseconds using SEAL
and A∗FV on CPU and GPU, respectively. It can be clearly seen
that A∗FV outperforms SEAL by at least one order of magnitude.
On average, A∗FV provides 22.36×, 18.67×, 91.88×, 4.40×, 48.07×,
334.56× and 54.59× speedup for KeyGen, Enc, Dec, HAdd, HSquare,
HMultPlain and HMult.
The results show that HSquare, which is used in the activation
layers, is the most time-consuming operation in our HCNNs. In
contrast, both HAdd and HMultPlain, which are used in the con-
volution and fully connected layers, are very cheap. Note that our
HCNNs can be modied to run an encrypted model on encrypted
data. This can be done by replacing HMultPlain by HMul. However,
this can have a severe eect on performance as HMult is the most
expensive primitive in FHE.
5.4 HCNNs Performance
Table 9 shows the runtime of evaluating our MNIST and CIFAR-10
HCNNs. As mentioned previously, we did not run CIFAR-10 with
SEAL as it will take a huge latency and resources. We include the
timing of all the aforementioned parameter sets. It can be clearly
seen that A∗FV outperforms SEAL signicantly for all parameter
sets. In particular, the speedup factors achieved are 109.86× at 76-bit
security level and 182.67× at 159-bit security level. The results show
that A∗FV is superior at handling large FHE parameters where the
maximum speedup is recorded. The amortized time represents the
per-image inference time. As the number of slots in ciphertext is
equal to N , note that in parameter sets (3 and 4) we can classify the
entire testing dataset of MNIST in a single network evaluation. On
the other hand, with parameter sets (1 and 2) we can classify 8192
images in a single network evaluation time.
The table also includes the latency of running our CIFAR-10
HCNN using A∗FV. We show the results of running our CIFAR-10
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Table 8: FHE primitives benchmarks using SEAL and
A∗FV on CPU and GPU, respectively. Time unit is millisec-
ond. Note that HMult was not used in HCNN.
Function ParameterID
SEAL
CPU
A∗FV
GPU Speedup
KeyGen
2 272.142 12.377 21.99×
4 542.920 21.392 25.38×
Enc
2 12.858 0.935 13.75×
4 25.991 1.496 17.37×
Dec
2 5.171 0.075 68.95×
4 10.408 0.098 106.20×
HAdd
2 0.126 0.052 2.42×
4 0.281 0.054 5.20×
HSquare
2 69.588 1.679 41.45×
4 138.199 2.371 58.29×
HMultPlain
2 7.680 0.033 232.73×
4 15.694 0.035 448.40×
HMult∗
2 86.270 2.014 42.84×
4 173.167 2.769 62.54×
Table 9: Latency (in seconds) of running HCNNs with SEAL
and A∗FV on multi-core CPU and GPU, respectively. PIT
refers to per-image time if packing is used.
HCNN Param multi-core CPU GPU Speedup
ID SEAL PIT A∗FV PIT
MNIST1G
1 Failure − 6.46 0.78×10−3 −
2 739.90 90.32×10−3 6.73 0.82×10−3 109.86×
3 Failure − 8.10 0.81×10−3 −
4 1563.85 156.38×10−3 8.56 0.85×10−3 182.67×
CIFAR-101G 5 − − 553.89 67.61 × 10−3 −
CIFAR-104G 5 − − 304.43 37.162 × 10−3 −
HCNN on 1 and 4 GPU cards. The latency shown here is per 1
plaintext modulus prime, i.e., 1 CRT channel. Note that we use 10
primes to evaluate CIFAR-10 HCNN. As our HCNNs will typically
be hosted by the cloud, one may assume that 10 machines can
evaluate CIFAR-10 HCNN in 304.430 seconds.
The results also show the importance of our low-precision train-
ing which reduced the required precision to represent MNIST
HCNN output. This allows running a single instance of the network
without plaintext decomposition, i.e., single CRT channel. We re-
mark that CryptoNets used higher precision training and required
plaintext modulus of higher precision (280). Therefore, they had to
run the network twice using two CRT channels.
We also note that our timing results shown here for SEAL are
much higher than those reported in CryptoNets (570 seconds at
80-bit security). This can be attributed to the following reasons:
1) CryptoNets used the YASHE′ levelled FHE scheme which is
known to be less computationally intensive compared to BFV that
is currently implemented in SEAL [31]. It should be remarked that
YASHE′ is no more considered secure due to the subeld lattice
attacks [4], and 2) CryptoNets include a smaller number of HMult
as shown in Table 3.
Lastly, we compare our best results with the currently available
solutions in the literature. Table 10 shows the reported results of
previous works that utilized FHE to evaluate HCNNs on dierent
datasets. As we can see, our solution outperforms all solutions
in total and amortized time. For instance, our MNIST HCNN is
70.29×, 3.53× and 4.83× faster than CryptoNets, E2DM and Faster
CryptoNets, respectively. Note that E2DM classies 64 images in
a single evaluation. Similarly, our CIFAR-10 HCNN is 3.83× and
7.35× faster than CryptoDL and Faster CryptoNets, respectively.
Table 10: Comparison of running time (seconds) between
prior FHE-based HCNNs and our HCNNs.
Model Runtime λ Dataset Platform
Total Amortized time
CryptoNets [16] 570 69.580×10−3 80 MNIST CPU
E2DM [24] 28.590 450.0×10−3 80 MNIST CPU
Faster CryptoNets [15] 39.100 39.100 128 MNIST CPU
A∗FV 8.100 0.008×10−3 175 MNIST GPU
CryptoDL [21] 11686 − 80 CIFAR-10 CPU
Faster CryptoNets [15] 22372 22372 128 CIFAR-10 CPU
A∗FV 3044 0.372 91 CIFAR-10 GPU
5.5 Noise Growth
In this experiment, we show the noise growth behaviour in both
SEAL and A∗FV. We recall that SEAL version (2.3.1) implements
the BEHZ [7] RNS variant of the BFV scheme. On the other hand,
A∗FV implements another RNS variant known as the HPS [20].
Although both variants implement the same scheme, it was found
by Al Badawi et al. [2] that these variants exhibit dierent noise
growth behaviour. Figure 5 shows the noise growth behaviour in
both SEAL and A∗FV for the parameter sets 3 and 4. The vertical
axis represents the noise budget which can be viewed as the “signal-
to-noise” ratio. Once the noise budget reaches 0 in a ciphertext, it
becomes too noisy to compute further or to decrypt successfully. It
should be remarked that the noise budget can be only calculated
given the secret key. As seen in the gure, parameter set 3 is not
sucient to provide SEAL with sucient noise budget to evaluate
the MNIST HCNN. The ciphertexts generated by the fully connected
layer include noise budget 0. Although no further computation
is required after the fully connected layer, decryption fails due to
the high noise level. On the other hand, A∗FV has lower noise
budget consumption rate that is sucient to run MNIST HCNN
with some left out noise budget (21 bits in parameter set 3 and
49 bits in parameter set 4). Parameter set 4 provides higher noise
budget that is sucient to run the MNIST HCNN in both SEAL and
A∗FV successfully.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented a fully FHE-based CNN that is able to
homomorphically classify the encrypted images with FHE. The
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Figure 5: Noise budget (in bits) and how it is consumed by SEAL and A∗FV
main motivation of this work was to show that privacy-preserving
deep learning with FHE is dramatically accelerated with GPUs
and oers a way towards ecient M/DLaaS. Our implementation
included a set of techniques such as low-precision training, unied
training and testing network, optimized FHE parameters and a
very ecient GPU implementation to achieve high performance.
We managed to evaluate our MNIST HCNN in one CRT channel
in contrast to previous works that required at least two channels.
Our solution achieved high security level (> 80 bit) and reasonable
accuracy (99%) for MNIST and (77.55%) for CIFAR-10. In terms of
performance, our best results show that we could classify the entire
testing dataset in 6.46 and 3044 seconds for MNIST and CIFAR-10
respectively, with per-image amortized time (0.78 milliseconds) and
(371 milliseconds), respectively.
In its current implementation, our HCNNs have adopted the
simple encoding method of packing the same pixel of multiple im-
ages into one ciphertext, as described in Section 3.1. This packing
scheme is ideal for applications that require the inference of large
batches of images which can be processed in parallel in a single
HCNN evaluation. Other application may have dierent require-
ments such as classifying 1 or a small number of images. For this
particular case, other packing methods that pack more pixels of
the same image in the ciphertext can be used. As future work, we
will investigate other packing methods that can t a wider range of
applications. Moreover, we will target more challenging problems
with larger datasets and deeper networks.
In addition, we noticed that training deep CNNs using polynomially-
approximated activation functions does not maintain high predic-
tion accuracy. Further research is required to nd the best methods
to approximate activation functions in FHE.
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